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No. 74-775 
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS 
v. 
Preliminary Memo 
~from CA 5 
~~~~e~r~g~, ?, ?)1/ 
DUKES Federal/Civil 
Summary: The City of New Orleans attacks the holding of the 
Fifth Circuit that a New Orleans ordinance which restricted vendor 
permits for the sale of hot dogs in the French Quarter to those 
·-------------------=--------
who h~d lawfully been in the business more than eight years :is 




unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as creating a 
statutory classification without rational relationship to a 
legitimate state purpose. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. - 457, 463-64. 
Appellant City argues the statutory classification is rationally 
related to various legitimate objectives. 
Facts: Appellee Dukes maintained a pushcart business in 
the Vieux Carre (French Quarter) in New Orleans for about a year 
prior to January 1, 1972. On that date the New Orleans City 
Council revised its ordinances, removing hot dog vendors from 
the list o£ permitted pushcart enterprises in the Vieux Carre 
but simultaneously allowing all licensed vendors who had 
conti~uously operated there for over eight years pr3.or to 
------._ - y 
January 1, 1972 to continue selling. The only peddler to 
---., ----___________, 
actually qualify for a Vieux Carre permit was a firm called 
Lucky Dogs, Inc. When other hot dog vendors who were friends -
of Dukes were arrested for operating in the Vieux Carre and 
when she was unable to obtain a permit for the area, she filed 
suit in USDC (E.D. La.) (Gordon) under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 
arguing that the municipal ordinances were unconstitutional 
1/828 MCS 46-1 does not include the sale of hot dogs in the Vieux Carre 
as an approved activity although the sale of hot dogs is allowed in other 
places. However, 828 MCS 46-1.1 added on the same day that the Vjeux 
Carre was removed from the approved list provides that "vendors who have 
continuously operated within that area .•• [with a permit] for eight years 
prior to January 1, 1972 may obtain a ••• permit to operate" the business 
within the area of the Vieux Carre. 
\ 
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and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On stipulated 
facts the USDC, finding no issues of fact, granted judgment 
for the City. The CA reversed, holding the statutory "grandfather 
clause" irrational under the test of Morey, supra, and hence un-
constitutional. 
Jurisdiction: Appellant City seeks to appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(2) which provides for review by this Court of cases in the 
courts of appeal: 
"By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by 
a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the 
constitution ••• but such appeal shall preclude review 
by writ of certiorari at the instance of such appellant." 
The enactment in question is a city ordinance -- not an enactment 
<----------
,· . 
of statewide application. In contrast to appeals from three-judge ----
federal courts where "state statute" requires a state enactment of 
statewide application [Cases collected in Stern & Gressman, 
Supreme Court Practice§ 2.14, p. 49-51], a line of cases have 
held that "state statute" for the purpose of§ 1254(2) jurisdiction -
includes municipal ordinances. See Id. at § 2.6, p. 32; United --------------
Gas Co. v. ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 135; Chicago v. Atchison, 
T. & S.F. R. Co., 357 u.s. 77, 82. These cases appear controlling 
unless the logic of cases such as Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees 
Credit Union, u.s. (1974) indicate that this anomalous 
·'-.......--'• 
~-· interpretation ought to yield to the policy factors expressed jn 
·. 
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Gonzalez. If the case is not a proper appeal, it may be treated 
as a petition for cert even though it was brought under§ 1254(2). 
Bradfort Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 284 U.S. 221, 224; 
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 501-503. The preclusion clause 
in§ 1254(2) applies only if the case is actually considered by 
this Court as an appeal. 
Contentions: The Fourteenth Amendment doesn't outlaw clas-
sification -- only irrational discrimination. "A statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any set of facts reasonably 
may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 u.s. 
420 (1961). New Orleans and the nation have a vital interest in 
preserving the Vieux Carre as a place of beauty and as a historical 
landmark. The New Orleans City Council observed the Quarter was 
being overrun by hawkers and peddlers in substantial numbers 
whose rude assaults on sightseers and tourists alike were destroying 
the nature of the Quarter and its economic contribution in attracting 
tourists. The traditional hot dog peddler of the Quarter, Lucky 
Dogs, for many years has used decorative carts which have become 
a part of the beauty of New Orleans. This statutory classification 
suitably furthered an appropriate governmental interest. Further 
,.~.a.) ,.$ 
~bt~i· any burden imposed on appellee Dukes is de minimis: the entire 
~t CUCA-
!!t~. except for the Vieux Carre is available for her business. 
'-../ "'.:::=t 
tD \a.ce..- ., 
~~~~~ Although Lucky Dogs is the only peddler who actually qualified 
~,_ 
~~'~ to use the Quarter under the grandfather clause, not all legislative 
-5-
monopolies fall. Under Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 529-530, 
538 (1934) such monopolies will be upheld where because of 
scarcity of space or other legitimate reasons the grant of such 
monopoly is a rational choice. Here large numbers of peddlers 
are incompatible with the historic nature of the Vieux Carre. 
In such circumstances the grandfather clause even if construed as 
the grant of a legislative monopoly is a rational choice and 
hence satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The CA found the "traditional" equal protection test of Morey 
v. Doud, supra, applicable. However on the authority of that case 
:\._..I this ordinance falls. Like American Express in Morey, there is 
no showing here that Lucky Dogs or other traditional peddlers wjll 
operate in a manner more consistent with the traditions of the 
Quarter than any other peddler. In the same way that the exemption 
of American Express from future regulation was irrational because 
there were no guarantees of its future performance, the grant of 
an effective legislative monopoly to Lucky Dogs falls here. 
Stanley v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 295 u.s. 76 which upheld the 
grant of a legislative monopoly is of no aid to appellant since 
there the legislative scheme was directed towards permitting only 
qualified applicants to do business and held open the possjbility 
of licences for future qualified applicants unlike this scheme 
which totally eliminates the possibility of future entry. There 
are many other valid legislative means to the accomplishment of 
•,. 
~- . 
1i ... • 
.I 
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the end s s o ught by New Orleans but the instant "grandfather 
clau s e " falls as irrational. 
Di s c ussion: On the merits there are good arguments either 
way. See ~, Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552 
(1947). The analogy by theCA to Morey v. Doud, supra, is not 
a complete one and Morey does not necessarily control the instant 
case. 
The ca se off ers an opportunity to limit the appellate juris-
diction of the Court by interpreting "state statute" as used in 
28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) in the same way as it is interpreted under 
28 U.S.C. § 1253 -- an enactment of statewide application. 
The case probably warrants calling for a Motion to Affirm/ 
Dismiss from appellees. 
There is no Motion to Affirm/Dismiss. 




k ~u~~ ~ --t--e-e-~u. .4-r...J , 
tl1o /ULO~h) 0-u!.--- ~ ?~-'~!/ 
No. 74-~~ ~~ ( ~ c~._t -t.<.U>~ 
~-c. 1-c: J__ ~ /yz...&--<.-~~ 
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS / 0 1 ~ 1 /J ~ _. 
v. ~ -<.At!-z:-iL-/~ r-e~  V~-~..) 
DUKE ~-t.~-<j ~ -fu..~r.J....l. tA....,') k f- ~--:z_..V-
I am inclined to agree with the noeewriter!~suggestion that 
~- - -- ~ ----- -- --· "state statute" under 1254(2) should be restricted 
to enactments of statewide application. It seems absurd to hold 
that consideration of city ordinances of this ,rtype fall within 
the Court's mandatory jurisdiction. 
On the merits, I think the CA was wrong. Grandfather clauses 
are by nature somewhat irrational; the only real issue is how far 
back the clause should reach. That's aw:t:XAXijW&:tiamzai generally an 
issue that reveolves around politics rather than the merits of 
the"' various competitors. v I · 1 If this caee were arising an 
cert, however, I'd deny cert. It's not a very important case. In 
any event, the Vieux Carre is a zoo and the addition of a few more 
hotdog venders will only make life for fat people like me easier. 
David 
t-z__ '7 rk-{) L.~ 1-a_~o._ 
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The Court postponed jurisdiction over this appeal from CA 5. The sub-
stantive is sue raised involves the constitutionality of a New Orleans ordinance 
restricting vendor permits for the~ale of hotdogs in the French Quar§j}to those 
to ~ '-{eJ who had !awfully been in the business more than ei~t years. The Court granted 
~ j appellee 1 s motion to proceed IFF. - ~ • 
'bJ3 Appellee 1 s counsel, Joseph Neves :tv1arcal1 III1 Esquire of Louisiana, now 
moves that he be appointed to represent appellee before this Court. Mr. 1v1arcal1 
- ..... ::was .. ...,.,..., ........ ,...., "'"""-'=' -
first as General Counsel for the La. ACLU and now as a 11 referral attorney, 11 has -I, ' .. 






"permit law" in issue here and is "also very :familiar with so-called 1civil rights 
litigation1, of the type represented by the controversy before the Court herein, 
all of which involves 1invidious discrin1inatlon1 practice by State authorities. 11 
Counsel is a mem~ber of the bar of this Court. He submits that he is m~ore than 
----=:;;' ably qualified to brief and orall argue this matter before the Courto 
DISCUSSION: This is not a Criminal Justice Act case. The motion is 
controlled by 28 U. So C. 1915 and Rule 53(7). The standard appears to be indigency 
not inability to pay, and the only compensation involved is transportation and 
~ die1n expenses. 
One obvious problem with the instant motion is that it is filed by counsel, 
by counsel. It would seem that appellee should be heard from on the 1natter. 
> <::_ 
Although it is som.ewhat after the :fact, there is also the question of whether 
appellee qualifies for IFP treatment. Appellee is styled both here and below 
as "Nancy Dukes, cUb/a Louisiana Concessions'' and the Court has traditionalJy 
~~--
denied IFP status to artificial per sons. One final problem is that although appellee 
~ .......... 
in regards to her response 
state appellee 1 s inability to obtain counsel, although the latter might be inferred, 
Appellee does not appear to have been granted IFP status below. The affidavit 
notes, however, that CA 5 (Goldberg) pennitted appellee to proceed on typewritten 
transcripts and typewritten briefs. 
The Court lTii;Y wish to reconsid;;r the motion to proceed IFP or, at least 
n1otion by appellee and seck further finand al in onnation or tl1e type rcqunea _,___ _.... 
by Form 4, Fed. R. App. P. 
There is no response. 
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August 26, 1975 
No. 74-775, City of New Orleans v. Dukes. 
The purpose of this memo, dictated during the summer, 
is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and to record 
my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of the 
opinions and briefs. 
* * * * * * * 
This is the New Orleans "hot dog" vending case. A 
1972 ordinance restricted vendor permits for the sale of hot 
dogs by pushcart in the Vieux Carre (Latin Quarter) to vendors 
who had lawfully been in this business more then eight years. 
At the time of this enactment, there were only two 
licensed hot dog vendors operating in the Latin Quarter: Nancy 
Dukes, who had operated there in a small way for less than two 
years; and Lucky Dogs, Inc., that had conducted this business 
in the Latin Quarter for about twenty years. The effect of this 
provision of the ordinance was to preclude Dukes from the push-
cart selling of hot dogs in the Latin Quarter, leaving Lucky 
Dogs with a monopoly. 
A Dukes salesman was arrested for violating the ordinance, 
but the charge was dismissed. Thereafter~, Dukes instituted a 
* The appendix (2 volumes) in this case is so fouled up, and the 
briefs are so poor, that I find it difficult to be sure of the 
facts. I believe that the arrest warrant against Dukes : employee 
was dismissed prior to the institution of this suit. 
No. 74-77S 2. 
§ 1983 suit in the district court seeking a declaratory judgment 
and an injunction, alleging denial of equal protection and of due 
process under the federal constitution. 
The DC decided the case on cross summary judgment motions, 
sustaining the validity of the ordinance. I do not think the 
DC filed a written opinion, and there are no stipulated facts. 
CAS (Goldberg) reversed, holding that there was no 
rational basis for the "grandfather clause" which allowed Lucky 
Dogs to remain in business while precluding Dukes. CAS rejected 
Dukes' argument that the "compelling state interest" test applied. 
It found that there was no rational basis for the discrimination 
against Dukes, relying primarily on Morey v. Doud, 3S4 U.S. 4S7, 
463-64 (19S7). CAS noted, after recognizing the authority of 
New Orleans to make some economic discriminations, that the 
grandfather clause in this ordinance was "facially unusual in 
that its establishment of a closed class of favored enterprises" 
is supported "solely by the length of their tenure as established 
operations." The city argued, as it still does, that Lucky Dogs' 
long continued operation was a part of the tradition of the Latin 
Quarter. In rejecting this argument, CAS said: 
the hypothesis that a present eight year 
veteran of the pushcart hot dog market • • • 
will continue to operate in a manner more 
consistent with the traditions of the 
Quarter than any other operator is without 
foundation. 
No. 74-775 3. 
Appealability 
The first issue presented is whether this is a proper 
appeal under 28 u.s.c. § 1254(2), providing for review by this 
Court: 
by appeal by a party relying on a state 
statute held by a Court of Appeals to be 
invalid as repugnant to the Constitution 
The question is whether a city ordinance is, for pur-
poses of§ 1254(2), a "state statute." As a matter of semantics, 
the answer would appear to be plainly negative. This view is 
supported, also, by the fact that appeals from three-judge 
federal courts from the invalidating of a "state statute" require 
a state enactment of state-wide application. Nevertheless, there 
appear to be decisions of this Court which hold that "state 
statutes" include municipal ordinances for the purpose of juris-
diction under§ 1254(2). See United Gas Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 
369 u.s. 134, 135. 
In view, however, of our decision in Gonzales v. Auto-
matic Employees Credit Union (1975), in which we limited the scope 
of three-judge court appeals in light of the basic purpose of this 
jurisdiction, I think I would join four other justices in applying 
the "plain language" test to§ 1254(2). That is, I would construe 
"state statutes" to mean precisely that. 
No. 74-775 4. 
Merits 
Even if we conclude that an appeal does not confer 
jurisdiction, I believe we have the option to treat the appeal 
as a petition for certiorari. 
Finality? 
A further question raised by appellee is whether the 
judgment of CAS is final. Although the ordinance was held to 
be unconstitutional, the case was remanded to the district court 
to determine whether the entire pushcart vending ordinance is 
invalid, or whether merely the grandfather clause portion thereof 
is invalid. If the district court invalidates the grandfather 
clause, all hot dog vendors would be denied permits to operate. 
Subject to further consideration, and despite my general 
reluctance to liberalize the finality requirement, it does seem 
to me that the critical constitutional question has been resolved 
finally against the city. 
Merits 
If we reach the merits, I view the question as quite 
close. Judge Goldberg',s opinion is persuasive. It is "unusual," 
I believe, for a "grandfather clause" not to include all persons 
already within what fairly may be characterized as "the class." 
Here, the ba~ic class included pushcart vendors of hot dogs in the 
No. 74-775 5. 
Latin Quarter. There were only two of these, one who had been 
there nearly twenty years and one less than two years. Both 
were duly qualified to sell hot dogs prior to enactment of this 
ordinance. As Judge Goldberg noted, on its face the ordinance 
is discriminatory without a self-evident legitimate purpose. 
For the most part, the city's brief reads like it was 
written by the chamber of commerce. But putting this type of 
rhetoric aside, a substantial argument is made for the view that 
Lucky Dogs had in fact become a part of the "atmosphere" for 
which the Latin Quarter is famous. It is argued that this vendor 
has been selling hot dogs "from distinctive little carts, which 
are actually enlarged model versions of the product itself;" that 
these carts are attractive and appealing to tourists; are fre-
quently photographed and described in literature about the French 
Quarter: 
Postcards showing sight in the Vieux Carre 
invariably will contain the carts and their 
costumed attendants. (Appellant's brief 
p. 21.) 
On the "monopoly" issue, the city argues: 
The alleged monopoly in the case at bar was 
incidentally created by the city in its effort 
to maintain, as is, its main tourist attraction. 
The questioned grandfather clause is illustrative 
of the desire, not to favor particular businesses, 
but to maintain only those features which over 
the years, over a score of years in this case, 
have become landmarks in this area of the city 
of New Orleans. (City's brief p. 31.) 
No. 74-775 6. 
The foregoing type of argument, if in fact supported 
by the record, is not necessarily irrational. If indeed Lucky 
Dogs' vending of hot dogs over a twenty-year period has resulted 
in the creation of something akin to a "secondary meaning" for 
its particular type of operation, perhaps the city does have a 
legitimate interest in preserving it. Putting it differently, 
the city legitimately could limit the number of vending operations 
on these streets, and it may rationally have concluded -- if the 
facts justified it -- that only Lucky Dogs was truly compatible 
with the atmosphere for which the French Quarter is famous. 
My difficulty with the city's argument is that, the 
case having been decided on summary judgment and with inadequate 
affidavits, I am by no means sure as to its factual accuracy. 
This is certainly not a "great case," and I may conclude 
that it can be decided either way without doing violence to 
principled equal protection analysis. 
BOBTAIL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: C~rl Schenker DATE: October 21, 1975 
No. 74-775 New Orleans v. Dukes 
This case presents two questions: (1) Is a municipal 
ordinance a "state statute" for purposes of the § 1254(b) 
appellate jurisdiction? (2) Did New Orleans' grandfather 
clause violate equal protection by excluding some preexisting 
operators from the closed class? 
1. Jurisdiction 
To clear the underbrush, we can ignore appellee's 
claim that the judgment below is insufficiently "final" for 
purposes of review under§ 1254(b). I agree with you that i~s 
final enough. Besides, it may be doubted that finality is 
really required. It is true that finality has been held to be 
required by§ 1254(b). (Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U.S. 188, 189.) 
But the statutory language does not compel this result, and the 
requirement is probably erroneous. In Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. 
F.R. Co., 357 U.S. 77, the Court asked for briefing about whether 
the finality requirement should be r etained but failed to reach 
the issue. Even if the judgment is not final, the finality 
requirement could be jettisoned in this case (if an appeal 
otherwise lies) (The appellant did bri ef this point.) 
~ 
2. 
The real jurisdictional issue is whether "state statute" 
in § 1254(b) should be given the narrow "statewide statute" 
reading that prevails in § 1253 (three-judge court) cases. 
My sympathies lie with yours on the desirability of doing 
a "Gonzalez" on§ 1254(b), but I think it would be a much 
tougher row to hoe than was Gonzalez. Apparently ther e is 
only one precedent squarely in point. In Chicago v. Atchison, 
supra, the Court took § 1254(b) jurisdiction in a case involving 
a municipal ordinance. (It should be noted, however, that this 
was done without discussion.) But there are other 
cases in which § 1254(b) jurisdiction has been taken that did 
not involve statutetof statewide application. More importantly, 
the case law under § 1257(2) is replete with precedent for the 
proposition that a municipal ordinance is a "state statute" ---for appellate purposes. And the Court once so held after giving 
pl~nary consideration to that specific issue (over a vigorous 
dissent from Holmes and Brandeis). There's the rub. 
Section 1257(2) is a rough converse of§ 1254(b). It 
provides for appeals when a state court upholds a "state statute" 
against a claim of infirmity. Section 1257(2) is of considerably 
longer lineage than § 1254(b) because the federal circuit courts 
of appeal are a r a ther recent creation. From 1789 until 1925 
an appeal lay from state courts under predecessors of § 1257(2) 
where is drawn in question the validity of a statute 
of, or of an authority exercised under, any State 
and the decision is in favor of its validity. 
3. 
Under this statute it was frequently held that appeals lay 
from state decisions sustaining the validity of municipal 
ordinances, but those decisions could be rested on the "authority 
exercised under" clause. Then in 1925, the statute was amended. 
(The date is important because the amending statute also 
introduced§ 1254(b).) As amended, the predecessor read 
essentially as it does today, allowing appeal . 
where is drawn in question the validity of a 
statute of any State . . • and the decision is 
in favor of its validity. 
In King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 277 U.S. 
100 (1928), the Court considered whether deletion of the 
"authority exercised under" clause meant that appeals no longer 
lay in municipal ordinance cases. The conceded purpose of 
the 1925 legislation was to cut down the obligatory jurisdiction 
of the court. Nonetheless, the majority concluded that municipal 
ordinances were "statutes of any state." (The theory is that 
it is up to the state to determine how its law making authority 
will be exercised: a lot of state statutes or a lot of delegated 
authority.) Justices Holmes and Brandeis howled in dissent, 
complaining about how burdensome such trivial municipal ordinance 
cases were. But their complaints were to no avail. 
The same statute amending the predecessor of § 1257(2) 
enacted the predecessor of § 1254(b). The predecessor read: 
Any case in a circuit court of appeals where is 
drawn in question the validity of a statute of an¥ 
state ..• and the decision is against its valid1ty, 
may . . . be taken to the Supreme Court for review on 
• . . appeal. 
Today the statute reads: 
Cases in the court of appeals may be reviewed by 
the Supreme Court . . . (b) By appeal by a party 
relying on a state statute held by a court of 
appeals to be repugnant to the Constitution . . 
4. 
The change in structure and the substitution of "state statute" 
for "statute of any state" carne with the 1948 codification. But 
the reviser~ note attributes no significance to these 
formal changes, and I'll eat this memorandum if there is any. 
Thus: Section 1257(2) governs one head of appellate 
jurisdiction and was amended the same year § 1254(b) was introduced 
with the same "statute of any state" language. There is a 
precedent (King) an the books that holds a municipal ordinance 
to be a "statute of any state" for purposes of§ 1257(2). Ergo 
the Court must either (1) hold a municipal ordinance to be a 
s tate statute for purposes of § 1254(b) or (2) overrule King 
(or distinguish King disingenuously). 
Overruling King wouldn't come as e(.'slly as the change of 
\ direction in Gonzalez. Obviously the incentive for reading 
"state statute" not to include municipal ordinances is to get 
these trivial cases off the Court's obligatory docket. Similar 
thoughts led to the "statewide statute" reading of the three-
judge court statute. But in the case of the three-judge court 
statutory scheme, legislative history and other provisions 
supported the exclusion of municipal-ordinance cases. (See Ex 
parte Collins, 277 U.S. 551 (decided in the same volume as King). 
Not so here (especially while King stands). Secondly, if "state 
5. 
statute" (§ 1254(b)) or "statute of any state" (§ 1257(2)) 
doesn't include municipal ordinancesfor appellate purposes, 
the concept will have to be given another meaning for certiorari 
purposes. This would be required because § 1257(3) provides for 
review by cert "where the validity of a State statute is drawn 
in question" and the decision is against its validity. 
I think any argument that § 1254(b) can be construed 
differently than § 1257(2) would be rather weak. I suppose one 
could say that the purpose of § 1257(2) is to assure that state 
courts are not niggardly in their interpretation of federal 
law, while that problem is not presented by § 1254(b) cases. 
Therefore the substantive policies served by the two jurisdictional 
statutes would support a distinction by which more cases were let 
in by appeal under§ 1257(2) than under§ 1254(b). But one 
purpose of the 1925 Act in general was to cut down on the workload 
of the Court. And if municipal ordinances are included in "statute 
of any state," there obviously are going to be more § 1257(2) 
appeals than § 1254(b) appeals. In light of that purpose, it could 
be argued that § 1257(2) should be construed more narrowly rather 
than more broadly than§ 1254(b). Further, invalidatio~of state 
or municipal legislation by court s of appeals pose federalism 
problems that argue in favor of a broad interpretation of§ 1254(b). 
~~ In sum, I think its possible but extremely tough to exclude 
~ municipal ordinances from the operation of§ 1154(b). 
6. 
2. The Merits. 
If a better man or woman than I can find a rationale 
supporting a "Gonzalez" approach to§ 1254(b), there would be 
no appellate jurisdiction here. If the case ends up in that 
posture I think the Court should promptly deny cert. (As David 
Boyd noted on the pool memo, this case is not certworthy.) 
As to the merits of the merits, I agree with you that 
the case as presented to CA 5 is more or less a toss up. I 
think the CA 5 opinion is persuasive, however. It is a careful 
and narrow holding, simply asking the City to do something to show 
that the statutory scheme relates rationally to the alleged 
purpose of conserving the atmosphere of the Vieux Carre. I 
thus think the case is "affirmable" and probably should be 
affirmed if the merits must be reached. 
I am not sure that the case is properly "reversible." As 
you note in your aid-to-memory, the City relies heavily on its 
"preserve the Vieux Carre• rationale. But appellees brief 
) 
states that the statutory scheme has been expanded to cover an 
area twice as large as the Vieux Carre. (See Brief at 15-16.) 
If the area covered is twice as large as the Vieux Carre, the 
City would not seem to have articulated reasons in support of its 
statute. As I read your equal protection opinions, you are the 
leading exponent of "articulated reasons" on the Court. Thus 
I don't think you would want to reverse this statute on the 
"Vieux Carre" rationale if much more than the Vieux Carre is covered. 
7. 
CA 5 did not address this problem. It cites the 1972 
"Vieux Carre" ordinance when describing the grandfather clause. 
(See footnote 1). The text of this ordinance is found at 
Appellee's Brief at Appendix M. The ordinance now on the books, 
however, was passed in 1973. It is reproduced at Appellant's 
Brief at 3 and Appellee's Brief at Appendix Q. TheCA 5 opinion 
was dated September 24, 1974. It's a mystery to me why CA 5 
did't consider the amendment. In any event, the broader 
coverage makes reversal seem inappropriate. If the Court were 
not inclined to affirm, it should at most remand for consideration 
of the statute's constitutionality in light of the present 
scope of the statute. (I think affirmance would be appropriate 
despite the change of the area covered because the geography 
is f ar less crucial to affirmance than to reversal.) You might 
want to pursue this whole matter at oral argument. 
SUMMARY 
(1) There is appellate jurisdiction. 
(2) Affirm or remand for consideration in light of the 
present statutory framework. 
Carl 
October 25, 1975 
No. 74-775 New Orleans v. Dukes 
I dictate this memorandum after having reviewed the 
file, and again taken at look at the briefs (among the worst 
I have seen!), to record the following: 
1. Finality. The constitutionality of the ordinance 
was decided below. The case is certainly sufficiently final 
for review under§ 1254(2). 
2. Jurisdiction. The case comes to us as an appeal 
from CAS under§ 1254(2). That section provides for appeal 
from a decision of courts of appeal where a "state statute" 
has been held unconstitutional. The question is whether 
a city ordinance is a state statute for purposes of 1254(2). 
There is substantial authority for the view that an 
ordinance may be deemed a state statute for this purpose. 
King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100; and Chicago v. 
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe, 357 U.S. 77 (where the Court 
assumed 1254(2) jurisdiction without discussion). 
Unless four other Justices wish to reexamine these 
authorities, I suppose I should accept them. My preference, 
if writing on a clean slate, would be to construe 1254(2) 
in the same manner as § 1253 (three judge court) jurisdiction 
is construed, that is narrowly to require a statute of state-
wide application. But, for reasons indicated in Carl's memo 
of October 21, this is not a promising prospect. 
3. Merits. As indicated in my summer memo of August 
26, this case is a real "sport" and if it were a cert it 
should never have been taken. I am basically indifferent 
2. 
as to how the merits are decided, as I think a feeble argument -
and not much more - can be made on either side of the equal 
protection issue. 
On balance, I will vote to affirm on the merits. The 
city's "chamber of commerce" argument with respect to 








~~,.__-'-"L. (~ 1-~ ~) 
~, ~~ ~k~ Jzs-~(2_) 
~if<?·'-'%.-~~ 
L-z_ a---- ~~ ~ ~- ~- frv ~~ I c /} s-
ci!~ ~<-JG ~f' ~) ct.-~ 
th-:r~z_ L-z__ d!-~ /1~ • 
13-z-_ ·~ f-r 
~ v~'(~ a-lUJ 
~ ~r ~) ~~l .~-/Jl-'-t 
-~ J.-z;;; ec;sz:f=~ --i._;t-~~ C J4 :s-J-
~-
~ ~ ..k?-e--e-~~4 . -
~~~d( le4-~-L (~~ ' 
4 a..£'~~G~ 
&~~~/2 .. 
~ --£.;._ -4 4J>) . 
~<--~-- ~ c;z__ 
~~of~t~· ~ 
p :YD ~ t/~ I ~~A.~ 
:-~ ~~~~/U~~ 
~ '-t-~ ---et/' ~ 
. . 
,. 
. ' ' 
. . ' 
~(fv-Lkh7· 
~~ 14d~(!zrV 
~£./~ ~ Q W > ~ k-1-~ ~ _, 
(H~~~~~ 
5 ~ ?"~".J)_ ~~ ~~~ 
~--~ ~~ ~ ~-c-- C:~'l./~V-4~ 
/1'-$ 9L £~ ~~ ~~ ~~A..AJ •'~ 
~~~~~~~ 
~~:~~ 
~ c...d~~'-'.. ;Lo ~ ~ ~~ 
o/- ~~A.tl ~,~ v/- u~ • 
~~~cJr~ 
~<-~-~&-[ ~ ~~ 
wj~~~~~. 
" . 
,. . . 
' • • < • 
TJH· ('hid J usticc 
4JdL~ i.o LtJ/i. ~ 
~ • 62-• ..L.,A~ 4 ~ 
~ A.4«Lli«L . tf9.yc,.....,w;r:£l. 




~V~ • 9-f~ -
a-~ 






· . ~ ~c:2~ 
./ 












Blackmun, J. KJZ,~ ~? 
Rehnqui'-t. J. ~ 
w~~~~ 
t~..  . .:;..,..,-r·~ b.«.' ~ 
~~ ~J UJ-11 .. 
~~~~ 
9- ~d.,._.,~ 
~ ""'-"' ~ ~~ 
~ ~·-..-.Q...~ 
~ Ej/1. . 
To: 
~4~~~v~ -11,1z_ 
~~ ~ ~·'-! '--&.-~ 
C...._e... ~~s-o~ ~ 
:~ i¥':~0~1~ 
Mr. ~ce Wh'!;tr: 
Mr. Justice M~rshall 
Mr. Justice B1.1."k;nun 
Mr. Justtce Powell 
Mr. Justice R0h~quist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Kr. Justice Brennan 
~~'jatad: -lo/-J£.-
Reo1roulated: ____________ _ 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm 
No. 74:-775 
City of New Orleans et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Nancy Dukes, dba Louisi-
ana Concessions. 
On Appeal from the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit. 
[January -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
The question presented by this case is whether the 
provision of a New Orleans ordinance, as amended in 
1972, that excepts from the ordinance's prohibition 
against vendors' selling of foodstuffs from pushcarts in 
the Vieux Carre, or French Quarter, "vendors who have 
continually operated the same business within the Vieux 
Carre ... for eight years prior to January 1, 1972 . .. " 
denied appellee vendor equal protection of the laws in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 
Appellee operates a vending business from pushcarts 
throughout New Orleans but had carried on that busi-
ness in the Vieux Carre for only two years when the 
ordinance was amended in 1972 and barred her from 
1 The pertinent provision of the New Orleans ordinance, c. 46, 
§§ 1 and 1.1 of the Code of the City of New Orleans, as amended 
August 31, 1972, provides : 
"Vendors who have continuously operated the same business within 
the Vieux Carre under the authority of this Cha.pter for eight 
or more years prior to January 1, 1972 may obtain a valid permit 
to operate such business within the Vieux Carre." 
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continuing operations there.2 She had previously filed 
an action in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana attacking the validity of the former version 
of the ordinance,8 and amended her complaint to chal-
lenge the application of the ordinance's "grandfather 
clause"-the eight years or more provision-as a denial 
of equal protection. She prayed for an injunction and 
declaratory judgment. On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the District Court, without opinion, granted 
appellant city's motion. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reversed. 501 F. 2d 706 (197 4) . We 
postponed the question of this Court's jurisdiction to a 
hearing on the merits, 421 U. S. 908 (1975). We hold 1· 
that we have jurisdiction of appellant's appeal, and on 
the merits reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
The Vieux Carre--the "French Quarter"-of the city 
of New Orleans is the heart of that city's considerable 
tourist industry and an integral component of the city's 
economy.4 The sector plays a special role in the city's 
life, and pursuant to the Louisiana State Constitution, 
c. 8 of Art. V of the City's Home Rule Charter grants 
the New Orleans City Council power to enact ordinances 
designed to preserve its distinctive charm, character, and 
economic viability 
Chapter 46 of the Code of the City of New Orleans sets 
up a comprehensive scheme of permits for the conduct 
of various businesses in the city. In 1972, the Code was 
amended to restrict the validity of many of these per-
2 Most of appellee's sales, particularly during the summer months, 
were made in the Vicux Carre. 
8 JurisdiCtion was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1343 
(3) ( 4), and 2201-2202. The Equal ProtectiOn violation was alleged 
to constitute a vwlation of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983, 1985. 
4 See generally App. Vol. II, at 31-63 (Excerpts from Compre-
hensive Study Plan for the Vieux Carre Under a Demonstration 
Grant from Department of Housmg and Urba.n Development) . 
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mits to points outside the Vieux Carre. However, even 
as to those occupations-including all pushcart food 
vendors-which were to be banned from the Vieux Carre 
during seasons other than Mardi Gras, the city council 
made the "grandfather provision" exception. Two push-
cart food vendors-one engaged in the sale of hot dogs 
and the other an ice cream vendor-had operated in the 
Vieux Carre for 20 or more years and therefore qualified 
under the "grandfather clause" and continued to operate 
there. The Q_ourt of Ap~ls recognized the "City 
Council's legitimate authority generally to regulate busi-
ness conducted on the public streets and sidewalks of the 
Vieux Carre in order to preserve the appearance and 
custom valued by the Quarter's residents and attractive 
to tourists," 501 F. 2d, at 709, but nevertheless found 
that e Council's justification for ' the '7i' randfather~x­
ception was "insu Cien to support the discrimination 
impose<r' and thus deprived appellee of equal protection. 
!d., at 711. Stating expressly that this Court's decision 
in Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 (1957) , was "our chief 
guide in resolving this case," 501 F. 2d, at 710, the Court 
of Appeals focused on the "exclusionary character" of the 
ordinance and its concomitant "creation of a protected 
monopoly for the favored class member." I d., at 712-
713. The "pivotal defect" in the statutory scheme was 
perceived to be the fact that the favored class members 
need not "continue to operate in a manner more con-
sistent with the traditions of the Quarter than would 
any other operator," id., at 711, and the fact that there 
was no reason to believe that length of operation "instills 
in the [favored] licensed vendors (or their likely tran-
sient operators) the kind of appreciation for the conserva-
tion of the Quarter's tradition" that would cause their 
operations to. beco:tne or remain consistent with that 
tradition. I d., at 712. Because these factors demon-
strated the "insubstantiality of the relation between the 
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nature of the discrimination and the legitimate govern-
mental interest in conserving the traditional assets of 
the Vieux Carre," id., at 713, the ordinance was declared 
violative of Equal Protection as applied and the case was 
remanded for a determination of the severability of the 
"grandfather clause" from the remainder of the ordinance. 
The court also expressed the view that alternative meas-
ures such as regulation of the location or appearance of 
pushcarts would be rational, given the city's purported 
objectives in enacting the ordinance. Ibid. 
I 
The question of this Court's jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal need detain us only briefly. 28 U. S. C. § 1254 
(2) grants jurisdiction to review decisions of the courts 
of appeals 
"By appeal by a party relying on a State Statute 
held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repug-
nant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the 
United States . .. . " 
A municipal ordinance is a "State Statute" for purposes 
of this provision. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 
U. S. 922, 927 n. 2 (1975); United Gas Pipe Line Co. 
v. Ideal Cement Co. , 369 U. S. 134 (1962). See also, 
e. g., Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112 (1967); Chicago v. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co ., 357 U. S. 77 
(1958); City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. , 355 U. S. 489 
(1958) . 
However, it is argued that the Court of Appeals' 
decision is not "final" under the doctrine enunciated in 
Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188 (1929) (predecessor 
statute to § 1254 (2)) , and South Carolina Electric & 
Gas Co . v. Flemming, 351 U. S. 901 (1956) (per curiam) , 
since the Court of Appeals, although finding the statute 
unconstitutional as applied, remanded the case to the: 
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District Court for a determination as to the severability 
of the "grandfather provision." There may be some 
question as to the continuing vitality of the "finality" 
requirement in the context of § 1254 (2), which unlike 
such jurisdictional statutes as 28 U. S. C. § 1257 and 
28 U. S. C. § 1291 has no "finality" provision in the 
statute itself., See, e. g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., supra, 
422 U. S., at 927; Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa 
Fe R. Co., supra, 357 U. S., at 82-83. But without 
resolving that question, we believe that any "finality" 
test is met under the facts of this case. 
The unconstitutionality of the ordinance, in its appli-
cation to appellee, has been definitely and finally adjudi-
cated by the Court of Appeals, and only a state law 
question remains to be decid~d on remand-whether the 
s'tatute will be totally invalidated or whether only its 
"grandfather provision" will be struck down. There is 
no federal, much less constitutional, question which is 
yet to be resolved below, and the policy underlying§ 1254 
(2)-ensuring that state laws are not erroneously invali-
·dated-will in no way be served by further delay in 
. adjudicating the constitutional issue presented. More-
over, since the outcome of the severability question will 
not moot a difficult constitutional issue in this case, the 
policy of avoiding needless constitutional decisions would 
not be furthered by staying our hand. Furthermore, to 
the extent any "finality" requirement in the context of 
~ 1254 (2) might be premised on the policies of avoiding-
piecemeal appeals or the rendering of advisory opinions, 
neither difficulty is likely to eventuate in this case; even 
if we were to uphold the Court of Appeals' remand for 
a determination of the severability of the "grandfather 
provision" under state law, the ruling on remand is not 
one which would be subject to further review in this 
Court.. On the other hand, a decision by this Court 
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rejecting the constitutional challenge to the statute will 
obviate the need for further proceedings and bring to a 
halt the continued disruption of the city's internal eco-
nomic affairs. Cf. generally, e. g., Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476-478, 480, 485-486 
(1975). We accordingly hold that this appeal is prop-
erly before us under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2) . We there-
fore turn to the merits. 
II 
The record makes abundantly clear that the amended 
ordinance, including the "grandfather provision," is solely 
l@ economic regulation aimed at enhancing the vital role 
of the F:r:ench Quarter's tourist-oriented charm in the 
economy of New Orleans. 
When local economic regulation is challenged solely 
as violating the "'E'qual!'rotection Clause, this Court con-
sistently defers to legislative determinations as to the 
desirability of particular statutory discriminations. See, 
e. g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 
U. S. 356 (1973). Unless the regulation trammels fun- ) 
damental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently 
suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, 
our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statu-
tory discriminations and require only that they be "rea-
sonable, not arbitrary, and . .. rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the 
object of the legislation." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 
361, 374 (1974). States are accorded wide latitude in 
the regulation of their local economies under their police 
powers, and rational distinctions may be made with sub-
stantially less than mathematical exactitude. Legisla-
tures may implement their program step-by-step, Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) , in such economic 
a:r:eas, adopting regulations that only partially amelio-
rate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination 
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of the evil to future regulations. See, e. g., Williamson 
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488-489 (1955). In 
short, the judiciary may not sit as a su erlegislature to 
judge the wisdom or es1rability of legislative policy 
determinations made in areas that neither affect funda-
mental rights nor proceed along suspect lines, see, e. g., 
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 
(1952), Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 
- U. S. - (1976); in the local economic sphere, it is 
only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary 
act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See, e. g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 
726, 732 (1963).5 
The Court of Appeals held in this case, howev;:{ ~~~~ -
the "grandfather provision" failed even thejtest fimw~ 
~. We disagree. The Court of Appeals 
recognized that the city had identified its objective in 
enacting the provision as a means "to preserve the 
appearance and custom valued by the Quarter's residents 
5 Ferguson presented an analogous situation. There is a Kansas 
statute excepted lawyers from the prohibition of a statute making 
it a misdemeanor for any person to engage in the business of debt 
adjusting. We held that the exception of lawyers was not a denial 
of equal protection, stating, 372 U. S., at 532 : 
"Nor is the statute's exception of lawyers a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws to nonlawyers. Statutes create many classifica-
tions which do not deny equal protection of the laws; it is only 
'invidious discrimination' which offends the Constitution. . . . If 
the State of Kansas wants to limit debt adjusting to lawyers, the 
Equal Protection Clause does not forbid it." 
We emphasize again that these principles, of course, govern only 
when no constitutional provision other than the Equal Protection 
Clause itself is apposite. V cry different prmciples govern even 
economic regulation when constitutional provisions such as the 
Commerce Clause a.re Implicated, or when local regulation is 
challenged under the Supremacy Clause as inconsistent with rele-
vant federal laws or tnnties. 
I 
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and attractive to tourists." 501 F. 2d, at 709. The 
legitimacy of that objective is obvious. The city council 
plainly could further that objective by making the rea-
soned judgment that street peddlers and hawkers tend 
to interfere with the charm and beauty of an historic 
area and disturb tourists and disrupt their enjoyment of 
that charm and beauty, and that such vendors in the 
Vieux Carre, the heart of the city's tourist industry, 
might thus have a deleterious effect on the economy of 
the city. They therefore determined that to ensure the 
economic vitality of that area, such businesses should be 
substantially curtailed in the Vieux Carre, if not totally 
banned. 
It is suggested that the "grandfather provision," allow-
ing the continued operation of some vendors without 
Jl ~.,.__; limiting the number of permits they could obtain, was a 
.J.t.._~Jd k : ~ totally arbitrary and irrational method of achieving the 
J;P L t..k ;u- tpvz_... city's purpose. But rather than proceeding by the imme-
~- t.h.• cf.n .t.~" 1(../diate and absolute abolition of all pushcart food vendors, 
A<JJ ch [L....,t._Luv the city could rationally choose initially to eliminate 
ct..t<..d./JLJ..IW vendors of more recent vintage. It was suggested on 
~ ~N~T oral argument that the city will probably ultimately 
~ fk eliminate even the two vendors that qualified under the 
-f. LJ.M.a-1 uJ - "grandfather provision." This gradual approach to the 
'/!,~lA..Jl~J_L; ~lit_, problem is not constitutionally impermissible. The gov-
(~·.iJ 
1
_ erning constitutional principle was stated in Katzenbach 
v.J.:I-o...fd..J-v ~ v. Morgan, supra, at 657 : 
J:/ [~ ~~'t -lj_o.:/ 
w. dl..t.~ 0. l.J.f!L) 




i1 . [:_ ' <' 
.(1U~Ztflv, 
" • .. we are guided by the familiar principles that 
a 'statute is not invalid under the Constitution be-
cause it might have gone farther than it did," 
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339, that a legisla-
ture need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,~ 
Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 610, and 
that 'reform may take one step at a time, address-
ing itself to the phrase of the problem which seems; 
(~.A~ l 
' fl-l.t ()- "("( J. ('_ 
A I ..JI_LL.tf.Jv ,./_ t, 
'lJ.tl?1 Cc..t- a ja e.¢v ~ .. .vt;ff.A cl.t d 
'/.flA _.a..,utt.J., ~ . 'f &.Jv~ , ) 
'-"'~vi~ 
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most acute to the legislative mind,' Williamson v. 
Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489." 
The city could reasonably decide that newer businesses 
were less likely to have built up substantial reliance 
interests in continued operation in the Vieux Carre and 
that the two vendors which qualified under the "grand-
father clause"-both of which had operated in the area 
for over 20 years rather than only eight-had themselves 
become part of the distinctive character and charm that 
distinguishes the Vieux Carre. We cannot say that these 
judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a con-
stitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection. 
Appellee contends that the ordinance "eliminates" 
rather than "regulates" business, and that the city's argu-
ments concerning economic vitality and the charm and 
beauty of the Vieux Carre are simply feigned; the "real" 
intent of the city council is said to be the creation of a 
legislative monopoly in favor of a particular concern. 
But we decline to assess statutory distinctions by deter-
mining whether the law "eliminates" or "regulates," cf. 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, supra, at 732, or to invalidate ra-
tional economic legislation on the basis of presumed im-
proper motivation. There is no reason to presume that 
the monopoly effectively created by the ordinance was 
not merely the temporary and incidental effect of a par-
tial ban on street vendors which was designed to serve 
other purposes and which will eventually become a total 
ban. But even if the city created a permanent monop-
oly, that would not alter the applicable equal protection 
standard, or subject the discrimination to more careful 
scrutiny. Ferguson v. Skrupa, supra. There is nothing 
in the Equal Protection Clause which denies a city the 
option of establishing a monopoly if the city rationally 
believes that reduced competition will benefit it economi-
cally by preventing an unsightly and bothersome prolifer-
7 4-775-0PINION 
10 NEW ORLEANS v. DUKES 
ation of street vendors, thereby fostering increased tour-
ism. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 527-530 
(1934). Contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, the fact 
that other regulation-such as limits on the number of 
permits-could accomplish the same legitimate objective 
does not mean that the Constitution requires New 
Orleans to adopt one rational alternative rather than 
another merely because judges regard one to be the 
wiser or otherwise preferable choice; such policy deci-
sions in the purely economic realm are properly com-
mitted to more representative bodies of our Federal and 
State Governments. And to the extent due process 
procedural safeguards might attend the selection of the 
party that will be the beneficiary of any such state-
authorized grant of monopoly that might rationally be 
established, appellee makes no argument that there was 
a denial of procedural due process during the creation or 
modification of the city's permit scheme.6 
Nevertheless, relying on Morey v. Doud, supra, as its 
"chief guide," the Court of Appeals held that even though 
the exemption of the two vendors was rationally related to 
legitimate city interests on the basis of facts extant when 
the ordinance was amended, the "grandfather clause" 
still could not stand because "the hypothesis that a 
present eight-year veteran of the pushcart hot dog market 
in the Viex Carre will continue to operate in a manner 
more consistent with the traditions of the Quarter 
than would any other operator is without founda-
6 Although appellee in her complaint asserted that the ordinance 
denied her due process, it appears from the record that this was 
a substantive due process claim concerning a nonfundamental right. 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S., at 729-732, finally interred such 
claims. The Court of Appeals did not address any due process 
issues, and appellee made no claim in her briefs or at oral argument 
of any infirmity in the procedures by which the permit scheme was 
promulgated or implemented. 
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tion." 501 F. 2d, at 711. Since the city has not imposed 
specific requirements that current operational methods or 
particular standards be maintained by the beneficiaries 
of the "grandfather clause," or that they not seek an 
increased number of permits, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the classification was arbitrary and irrational 
and therefore unconstitutional. But there was no evi-
dence in the record that elimination of more recent ven-
dors has caused any such changes. In any event, we 
repeat, legislatures need not regulate currently to meet 
all future contingencies, and the constitutionality of such 
economic regulation cannot be impugned merely because 
some speculative future developments might cause the 
regulation to outlive its usefulness or render it irrational. 
The city can take account of such changed conditions if 
and when they occur. Actually, the reliance on the stat-
ute's potential irrationality in Morey v. Doud, as the dis· 
:renters in that case correctly pointed out, see 354 U. S., 
at 474-475 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), was a needlessly 
intrusive judicial infringement on the State's legislative 
powers, and we have concluded that the equal protection 
analysis empfoyed m that opinion shoula no longer b 
fo lowe . orey was e y case m the last ha cen-
tury to invalidate a wholly economic regulation solely on 
equal protection grounds, and we are now satisfied that 
the decision misapplied the . ra~ional relationship test. 
I Morey is, as appellee and the Court of Appeals properly recognized, essentially indistinguishable from this case/ 
7 Since it was known that there were only two vendors eligible 
for the benefits of the "grandfather provision,, and since the legis-
lation as enacted would not permit alteration of the closed class 
without subsequent legislation, there is no analytical difference 
between this case and Morey, where the beneficiary of the legisla-
tive exception was specifically named. The Illinois statute invali· 
dated in Morey excepted American Express Company from the 
Illinois statute that licensed and regulated currency exchanges 
engaged in the business of issuing or selling money orders. 
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but the decision so far departs from proper equal protec-
tion analysis in cases of exclusively economic regulation 
that it should be, and it is, overruled. 
The judgment of the C6urt of Appeals is reversed and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
.ju.vrtmt <!}curt cf t4t ~nittb .jt~dts 
Jfasfrittgtcn. to. <!}. 2.0.?'!-~ · 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
January 28, 1976 
Re: No. 74-775 - City of New Orleans v. Dukes 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 





Re: New Orleans v. Dukes, No. 74-77S 
Your conference vote was to affirm CAS, but you indicated 
that you ~~ probably would not dissent from a reversal. On that 
basis I think you can join this opinion. 
My principal reason for thinking this case could not be 
reversed was that the statute we are considering has been amended 
to make the grandfather clause exclusmon applicable to an area 
wider than the Vieux Carre. It seemed to me that we could not 
affixm uphold the validity of a statute that was no longer on the 
books ~KXKXKMKKMXXKX In a sense the controversy as to that statute 
was moot; further, since the statute had changed and the parties 
had not addressed it, the only reasons articulated for the statute 
'-
by the City dealt with the Vieux Carre only, not the wider area 
now cove red. 
My views on that matter stemmed from my XKR understanding from 
the CAS opinion that only declaratory and injunctive relief had 
been sought. But Dukes also sought damages against the individual 
defendant. Thus, the validity of the old statute must be ae«iaHa 
decided in this case, withdrawing any"mootness" related problems 
and making XX relevant the articulated reasons advanced by the 
City. 
The question therefore becomes the validity of those reasons. 
That is pretty much an arguable case, as NMK we both have felt 
all along. Brennan's opinion manages to make the statute sound 
just about as rational as possible and does no damage to the 
developing "articulated reasons" jurisprudence of the Court.~ 
OnX that score, I might note that the opinion does not do all that 
it might MXM have to make clear whatH the City argued and 
what the Court is hypothesizi?9 ' which is really very little. 
But it doesn't do anythin~1gest that the Court will create 
rationales and justifications for statutes. Thus, the opinion 
is consistent with your stand on articulated reasons. 
The foregoing all leads me to conclude thwt you can JMJ 
join despite your conference vote. If you want to adhere to your 
conference vote we could attack the rationality of tre statute 
with some force. (Basically, the complaint is that there are no 
limitations on « how Lucky Dog comports its business in the 
Vieux Carre. But some of the force of these arguments was taken 
away at oral argument with the suggestion that all vendors might 
be eliminated eventually. If that KK is the City's plan, failing 
to restrict Lucky Dogs for the time being is not really so signi-
ficant. Since Brennan makes the most of this, our counter 
rationality arguments ~KXXKMH would sound thinner than they 
otherwise would.) 
On the big strategic picture, I must admit some surprise to 
Brennan's a~~x~ak approach here, which is basically a real roll-
XM over-and-play-dead one in economic regulation cases. This 
might not be totally consistent with your view that equal pro-
tection analysis outside the "suspect classes"should beX more 
than minimal. But there is nothing satd KKK that's inconsistent with 
your view--it's more a matter of toneo 
1 My one carp is that at p. b._M he refers to '~alienage" as a 
suspect classification. Who knows what alienage is? You might want 
but I think KKKMX there is enough support in the cases to sustain it--
depending on the alienage cases now being written. 
CHA"''BERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.. 
.§u:prttnt ~o-ttrl .of fire ~b $)ta.trs 
~ IUlfri:n.gLm. ~. <!f. 21T?J!. ;1 
March 4, 1976 
,. 
Re: 74-775 - City of New Orleans v. Dukes 
! 
~ 
Dear Bi 11: 
I am generally with you, but I cannot join 
saying that alienage is a "suspect classification". 
I can no longer go along with these "litmus" words. 
In short, I can easily be 11 had". 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
v 
., 
T~Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Just'ce Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice l1lrshall 
Mr · Just co Blackmun / 
Mr. Jur,t~.co Pove1v·· 7 
Mr. ,Jt tl,...o r:o-.Jhnquis 
Mr. Justice SLeve s 
From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: APR 1 4 1976 
Recirculated: 
Re: 74-775 - City of New Orleans v. Dukes -------
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring. 
I join the (proposed) opinion of the Court overruling Morey v. 
Doud, supra, essentially because I believe that case was wrongly 
decided for the reasons expressed at the time by Justices Black, 
Frankfurter and Harlan. The political branches of government must 
have wide scope in regulating commercial activity, and whether the 
choices made by the city government here are wise and sound, or the 
contrary, it is not the function of judges to reassess them on the basis 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
\ 
CHAMI!IERS O F" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.prttttt <!Jonrl of tqt ~~ j;tatt.r 
'J!ias lfinghtn. ~. Of. 2llp'k $ 
April 15, 1976 
Re: 74-775 - City of New Orleans v. Dukes 
Dear Bill: 
j 
On further reflection I think I will withdraw 
my concurring opinion and concur in the judgment. I 
have other problems with the opinion itself but prefer 
not to add to the literature with more writing. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM!!lERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.§u.prtntt a}ourlltf t4t ~b j\taltg 
:Jfas4ittghtn, ~. (!}. 20~~~ 
June 16, 1976 
Re: 74-775 - New Orleans v. Dukes 
Dear Bill: 
/ 
I join your opinion as modified. If you can "swallow'' 
it, why not sign as originally? 
Mr. Justice Brennan 




C HAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
jiu:prttttt <!Jl11trl d t!tt ~tb ~taft• 
._Mlfi:ttiliott. ~. (!}. 2llp~~ 
/ 
June 16, 1976 
Re: No. 74-775 - New Orleans v. Dukes 
Dear Bill: 
Ple ase join me in your revised•circulation. I agree 
with Potter and the Chief that it should be a signed opinion 
unless you prefer otherwise. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Confere nce 
. ',, 
, -. ' 
---~~ 
. a-j~ 
~~~ 2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAm ~ f.&•e ,(, ~ 
No. 74-775 t ~~ \I 
City of New Orleans et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Nancy Dukes, db a Louisi-
ana Concessions. 
On Appeal from the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit. 
[January -, 1976] 
~~~'"--~~IIi~~>:-. ~JJ.:Iir;ijTS~T:.LTC:CEL.BtmpEE.}}!T~Mj;,A~~}*-T -'Q""i;N.l~i1:~q;~ji:p~9Qiil:-"t6fs~e~6~~~Hftfi*i9*1t~O;Ilf-1J±ht~.~ee,. 
} CeHFt.-
The question presented by this case is whether the 
provision of a New Orleans ordinance, as amended in 
1972, that excepts from the ordinance's prohibition 
against vendors' selling of foodstuffs from pushcarts in 
the Vieux Carre, or French Quarter, "vendors who have 
continually operated the same business within the Vieux 
Carre ... for eight years prior to January 1, 1972 . . . " 
denied appellee vendor equal protection of the laws in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 
Appellee operates a vending business from pushcarts 
throughout New Orleans but had carried on that busi-
ness in the Vieux Carre for only two years when the 
ordinance was amended in 1972 and barred her from 
1 The pertinent provision of the New Orleans ordinance, c. 46, 
§§ 1 and 1.1 of the Code of the City of New Orleans, as amended 
August 31, 1972, provides : 
"Vendors who have continuously operated the same business within 
the Vieux Carre under the authority of this Chapter for eight 
or more years prior to January 1, 1972 may obtain a valid permit 
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continuing operations there.2 She had previously filed 
an action in the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana attacking the validity of the former version 
of the ordinance,8 and amended her complaint to chal-
lenge the application of the ordinance's "grandfather 
clause"-the eight years or more provision-as a denial 
of equal protection. She prayed for an injunction and 
declaratory judgment. On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the District Court, without opinion, granted 
appellant city's motion. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit reversed. 501 F. 2d 706 (1974). We 
postponed the question of this Court's jurisdiction to a 
hearing on the merits, 421 U. S. 908 (1975). We hold 
that we have jurisdiction of appellant's appeal, and on 
the merits reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
The Vieux Carre--the "French Quarter"-of the city 
of New Orleans is the heart of that city's considerable 
tourist industry and an integral component of the city's 
economy.4 The sector plays a special role in the city's 
life, and pursuant to the Louisiana State Constitution, 
c. 8 of Art. V of the City's Home Rule Charter grants 
the New Orleans City Council power to enact ordinances 
designed to preserve its distinctive charm, character, and 
economic viability 
Chapter 46 of the Code of the City of New Orleans sets 
up a comprehensive scheme of permits for the conduct 
of various businesses in the city. In 1972, the Code was 
amended to restrict the validity of many of these per-
2 Most of appellee's sales, particularly during the sununer months, 
were made m the Vieux Carre. 
8 Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1343 
(3) ( 4), and 2201-2202. The Equal ProtectiOn violation was alleged 
to constitute a vwlation of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983, 1985. 
4 See generally App. Vol. II, at 31-63 (Excerpts from Compre-
hensive Study Plan for the Vieux Carre Under a Demonstration 
Grant from Department of Housmg and Urban Development). 
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mits to points outside the Vieux Carre. However, even 
as to those occupations-including all pushcart food 
vendors-which were to be banned from the Vieux Carre 
during seasons other than Mardi Gras, the city council 
made the /(grandfather provision" exception. Two push-
cart food vendors-one engaged in the sale of hot dogs 
and the other an ice cream vendor-had operated in the 
Vieux Carre for 20 or more years and therefore qualified 
under the /(grandfather clause" and continued to operate 
there. The Court of Appeals recognized the ucity 
Council's legitimate authority generally to regulate busi-
ness conducted on the public streets and sidewalks of the 
Vieux Carre in order to preserve the appearance and 
custom valued by the Quarter's residents and attractive 
to tourists," 501 F. 2d, at 709, but nevertheless found 
that the Council's justification for the /(grandfather" ex-
ception was /(insufficient to support the discrimination 
imposed" and thus deprived appellee of equal protection. 
/d., at 711. Stating expressly that this Court's decision 
in Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 (1957), was uour chief 
guide in resolving this case," 501 F. 2d, at 710, the Court 
of Appeals focused on the /(exclusionary character" of the 
ordinance and its concomitant ucreation of a protected 
monopoly for the favored class member." I d., at 712-
713. The upivotal defect" in the statutory scheme was 
perceived to be the fact that the favored class members 
need not ucontinue to operate in a manner more con-
sistent with the traditions of the Quarter than would 
any other operator," id., at 711, and the fact that there 
was no reason to believe that length of operation /(instills 
in the [favored] licensed vendors (or their likely tran-
sient operators) the kind of appreciation for the conserva-
tion of the Quarter's tradition" that would cause their 
operations to become or remain consistent with that 
tradition. Id., at 712. Because these factors demon-
strated the /(insubstantiality of the relation between the 
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nature of the discrimination and the legitimate govern-
mental interest in conserving the traditional assets of 
the Vieux Carre," id., at 713, the ordinance was declared 
violative of Equal Protection as applied and the case was 
remanded for a determination of the severability of the 
"grandfather clause" from the remainder of the ordinance. 
urt also expressed the view that alternative meas-
ures such as reg the location or appearance of 
ushcarts would be rational, given r orted 
objectives in enactin the ordinance. 
I 
The question of this Court's jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal need detain us only briefly. 28 U. S. C. § 1254 
(2) grants jurisdiction to review decisions of the courts 
of appeals 
"By appeal by a party relying on a State Statute 
held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repug-
nant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the 
United States . . .. " 
A municipal ordinance is a "State Statute" for purposes 
of this provision. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 
U. S. 922, 927 n. 2 (1975); United Gas Pipe Line Co. 
v. Ideal Cement Co. , 369 U. S. 134 (1962). See also, 
e. g., Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112 (1967); Chicago v. 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 357 U. S. 77 
(1958); City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. , 355 U. S. 489 
(1958). 
However, it is argued that the Court of Appeals' 
decision is not "final" under the doctrine enunciated in 
Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188 (1929) (predecessor 
statute to § 1254 (2)) , and South Carolina Electric & 
Gas Co . v. Flemming, 351 U. S. 901 '(1956) (per curiam) , 
since the Court of Appeals, although finding the statute 
unconstitutional as applied, remanded the case to th~ 
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District Court for a determination as to the severability 
of the "grandfather provision." There may be some 
question as to the continuing vitality of the "finality" 
requirement in the context of § 1254 (2), which unlike 
such jurisdictional statutes as 28 U. S. C. § 1257 and 
28 U. S. C. § 1291 has no "finality" provision in the 
statute itself., See, e. g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., supra, 
422 U. S., at 927; Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa 
Fe R. Co., supra, 357 U. S., at 82-83. But without 
resolving that question, we believe that any "finality" 
test is met under the facts of this case. 
The unconstitutionality of the ordinance, in its appli-
cation to appellee, has been definitely and finally adjudi-
cated by the Court of Appeals, and only a state law 
question remains to be decid~d on remand-whether the 
statute will be totally invalidated or whether only its 
"grandfather provision" will be struck down .. There is 
no federal, much less constitutional, question which is 
yet to be resolved below, and the policy underlying § 1254 
(2)-ensuring that state laws are not erroneously invali-
·dated-will in no way be served by further delay in 
adjudicating the constitutional issue presented. More-
over, since the outcome of the severability question will 
not moot a difficult constitutional issue in this case, the 
policy of avoiding needless constitutional decisions would 
not be furthered by staying our hand. Furthermore, to 
the extent any "finality" requi~ement in the context of 
§ 1254 (2) might be premised on the policies of avoiding 
piecemeal appeals or the rendering of advisory opinions, 
neither difficulty is likely to eventuate in this case; even 
if we were to uphold the Court of Appeals' remand for 
a determination of the severability of the "grandfather 
provision" under state law, the ruling on remand is not 
one which would be subject to further review in this 
Court.. On the other hand, a decision by this Court 
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rejecting the constitutional challenge to the statute will 
obviate the need for further proceedings and bring to a 
halt the continued disruption of the city's internal eco-
nf'mic affairs. Cf. generally, e. g., Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 476-478, 480, 485-486 
(1975). We accordingly hold that this appeal is prop-
erly before us under 28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2) . We there-
fore turn to the merits. 
II 
The record makes abundantly clear that the amended 
ordinance, including the "grandfather provision," is solely 
an economic regulation aimed at enhancing the vital role 
of the French Quarter's tourist-oriented charm in the 
economy of New Orleans. 
When local economic regulation is challenged solely 
as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court con-
sistently defers to legislative determinations as to the 
desirability of particular statutory discriminations. See, 
e. g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 
U. S. 356 (1973). Unless thQ X:'ilgwla.bawt:_.:r:.a;:mm:....::;e.;;.ls~fu~n.:;:- -r~-a.-cr~--:.7ft,....~7· ~~-:.:--
damental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently - ~ 
suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, 
our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statu- , . n 
r~t~or~y~d~is~c~ri~·m;i~n~a~ti~· o~n:s~a;nlld~re~u~i~re~o~njly~tgh~at~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~ sonable, not arbitrary, and ... rest upon some  k 
of difference having a fair an · a wn to the ~ctl~ ~ 
object of t · a Ion." Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. -h:> o. ~~-~~ 
, 4 (1~74) ) ta es are accorded wide atitude in <;{.cl:t ·,"-~ 
the regulation of their local economies under their police 
powers, and rational distinctions may be made with sub-
stantially less than mathematical exactitude. Legisla-
tures may implement their program step-by-step, Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), in such economic 
areas, adopting regulations that only partially amelio-
rate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination. 
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of the evil to future regulations. See, e. g., Williamson 
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488-489 (1955). In 
short, the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to 
judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy 
determinations made in areas that neither affect funda-
mental rights nor proceed along suspect lines, see, e. g., 
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 423 
(1952)~ M€hBBftehtt8tJUB }ijgg,rfi ef Reti,, e1ne1tt v. ll!l1trgia, o_ 
a U. g, (1Q76);. in the local economic sphere, it is 
only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary 
act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See, e. g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 
726, 732 (1963).5 
The Court of Appeals held in this case, however, that 
the "grandfather provision" failed even the test.6t--Ht.J~"" '----======------::::---, 
~ mal scr ubi~ We disagree. Cour of Appeals 
recognized that the city had identifiede_ts o Jective m 
enac mg the provision, as a means "to ~reserve the 
appearance and custom valued by the Quarter's residents 
5 Ferguson presented an analogous situation. There is a Kansas 
statute excepted lawyers from the prohibition of a statute making 
it a misdemeanor for any person to engage in the business of debt 
adjusting. We held that the exception of lawyers was not a denial 
of equal protection, stating, 372 U.S., at 532 : 
"Nor is the statute's exception of lawyers a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws to nonlawyers. Statutes create many classifica-
tions which do not deny equal protection of the laws; it is only 
'invidious discrimination' which offends the Constitution. . . . If 
the State of Kansas wants to limit debt adjusting to lawyers, the 
Equal Protection Clause does not forbid it." 
We emphasize again that these principles, of course, govern only 
when no constitutional provision other than the Equal Protection 
Clause itself is apposite. Very different principles govern even 
economic regulation when constitutional provisions such as the 
Commerce Clause are implicated, or when local regulation is 
challenged under the Supremacy Clause as inconsistent with rele-
vant federal laws or t:rmties. 
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and attractive to tourists." 501 F. 2d, at 709. The 
legitimacy of that objective is obvious. The city council 
plainly could further that objective by making the rea-
soned judgment that street peddlers and hawkers tend 
to interfere with the charm and beauty of an historic 
area and disturb tourists and disrupt their enjoyment of 
that charm and beauty, and that such vendors in the 
Vieux Carre, the heart of the city's tourist industry, 
might thus have a deleterious effect on the economy of 
the city. They therefore determined that to ensure the 
economic vitality of that area, such businesses should be 
substantially curtailed in the Vieux Carre, if not totally 
banned. 
cause it might have gone farther than it did,' 
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339·, that a legisla-
ture need not 'strike at all evils at the same time," 
Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 610, and 
that 'reform may take one step at a time, address-
ing itself to the phrase of the problem which seems; 
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most acute to the legislative mind,' Williamson v. 
Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489." 
The city could reasonably decide that newer businesses 
were less likely to have built up substantial reliance 
interests in continued operation in the Vieux Carre and 
that the two vendors which qualified under the "grand-
father clause"-both of which had operated in the area 
for over 20 years rather than only eight-had themselves 
become part of the distinctive character and charm that 
distinguishes the Vieux Carre. We cannot say that these 
judgments so lack rationality that they constitute a con-
stitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection. 
Appe ee con en s a e ordinance "eliminates" 
r er than "regulates" business, and that the city's argu-
ments ncerning economic vitality and the charm and 
beauty of e Vieux Carre are simply feigned; the "real" 
intent of th city council is said to be the creation of a 
legislative m nopoly in favor of a particular concern. 
But we declin to assess statutory distinctions by deter-
mining whethe the law "eliminates" or "regulates/' cf. 
Ferguson v. Skru supra, at 732, or to invalidate ra-
tional economic legis · n on the basis of presumed im-
proper motivation. There · no reason to presume that 
the monopoly effectively crea d by the ordinance was 
not merely the temporary and in ·dental effect of a par-
tial ban on street vendors which as designed to serve 
other purposes and which will even ally become a total 
ban. But even if the city created a ermanent monop-
oly, that would not alter the applicable ual protection 
standard, or subject the discrimination to re careful 
scrutiny. Ferguson v. Skrupa, supra. There i nothing 
in the Equal Protection Clause which denies a ity the 
option of establishing a monopoly if the city ra ionally 
believes that reduced competition will benefit it ec omi-
cally by preventi~g an unsightly and bothersome pro 
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ation of street vendors, thereby fostering increased tour 
ism. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 527- 0 
(1934). Contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, fact 
that other regulation-such as limits on the mber of 
permits-could accomplish the same legitim objective 
does not mean that the Constitution equires New 
Orleans to adopt one rational alter. ive rather than 
another merely because judges gard one to be the 
wiser or otherwise preferable oice; such policy deci-
sions in the purely econo · c realm are properly com-
mitted to more represe ative bodies of our Federal and 
State Governments And to the extent due process 
procedural safegu ds might attend the selection of the 
party that wi be the beneficiary of any such state-
authorize ant of monopoly that might rationally be 
estabr ed, appellee makes no argument that there was 
a ial of procedural due process during the creation or 
odifi ermit scheme.6 
Nevertheless, relying on Morey v. Doud, supra, as 1 s 
"chief guide," the Court of Appeals held that even though 
the exemption of the two vendors was rationally related to 
legitimate city interests on the basis of facts extant when 
the ordinance was amended, the "grandfather clause" 
still could not stand because "the hypothesis that a 
present eight-year veteran of the pushcart hot dog market 
in the Viex Carre will continue to operate in a manner 
more consistent with the traditions of the Quarter 
than would any other operator is without founda-
-.-....oa.~J:W.~J.g,C._5appellee in her complaint asserted that the ordinance 
denied her due ess, it appears from the record that this was 
a substantive due proce aim concerning a nonfundamental right. 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. ., 9-732, finally interred such 
claims. The Court of Appeals did not an due process 
issues, and appellee made no claim in her briefs or at or c 
of any infirmity in the procedures by which the permit scheme was 
promulgated or implemented. 
't4-'t't5-0PINION 
NEW ORLEANS v. DUKES 11 
tion." 501 F. 2d at 711. Since the city has not imposed 
spec reqUirements that current operational methods 
particular standards be maintained by the benefic· 1es 
of the "grandfather clause," or that they no eek an 
increased number of permits, the Court of peals con-
cluded that the classification was arbitr and irrational 
and therefore unconstitutional. 
on of more recent ven-
dors has caused any such anges. In any event, we 
repeat, legislatures ne not regulate currently to meet 
all future continge 'es, and the constitutionality of such 
economic regul · n cannot be impugned merely because 
some spec ive future developments might cause the 
regula · n to outlive its usefulness or render it irrational. 
T city can take account of such changed conditions if 
d when the oc c ua e s a -
ute's potential irrationality in Morey v. Doud, as the dis-
senters in that case correctly pointed out, see 354 U. S., 
at 474-475 (Frankfurter, J. , dissenting), was a needlessly 
intrusive judicial infringement on the State's legislative 
powers, and we have concluded that the equal protection 
analysis employed in that opinion should no longer be 
followed. Morey was the only case in the last half cen-
tury to invalidate a wholly economic regulation solely on 
equal protection grounds, and we are now satisfied that 
the decision misapplied the rational relationship test. 
Morey is, as appellee and the Court of Appeals properly 
recognized, essentially indistinguishable from this case/ 
· ce it was known t at there were only two vendors eligible 
for the be ts of the "grandfather provision," and since the legis-
lation as enac would not permit alteration of the closed class 
without subsequen ion, there is no analytical difference 
between this case and Morey, w the beneficiary of the legisla-
tive exception was speci.fically named. · ois statute invali· 
dated in Morey excepted American Express Com fr m the 
Illinois statute that licensed and regulated currency exchang 
engaged in the business of issuing or selling money orders. 
74-775~0PINION 
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but the decision so far departs from proper equal protec-
tion analysis in cases of exclusively economic regulation 
that it should be, and it is, overruled. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 





'M-' . I'll join1 unhappily, the "neutered~ version 
Murgia's 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.§ttttrttttt <!fo-~ o-f tqt ~ttittb ~faLg 
2i!lrMfrht-gtctt. IB. <!f. 2llgtJ!.~ 
June 17,~ 
Re: No. 74-775 - City of New Orleans v. Dukes 
Dear Bill: 
This 1s to let you know that I shall join the anticipated 
truncated per curiam opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Confe renee 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.§u:puuu cqourt .of tftt ~tittb ~tafu 
'l'Ua.s-Jringhm, Ill. cq. 2llc?J1~ 
June 21. 1976 I 
Re: No. 74-775 -- City of New Orleans v. Nancy Dukes 
Dear Bill: 
Please add to your Per Curiam. "Mr. Justice 
Marshall joins in the judgment." 
Sincerely. 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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